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Faculty and Deans

Funding 'Religion in a Post-Zelman World
By James G. Dwyer
In Zelman v. SimmonsHarris,! the Supreme Court
upheld against Establishment Clause challenge the
Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program, also known as
the Cleveland school voucher program. That program
facilitates transfer of children
from one of the worst public
school systems in the nation
to private schools in the
Cleveland area. As such, the
Cleveland program, like similar programs in Milwaukee and Florida, undoubtedly benefits some children.
From a child welfare perspective, then, there is reason
to be pleased with the Court's decision.
However, the Court in Zelman also established-not
explicitly, but in effect-a legal principle with far-ranging and troubling implications. This principle becomes
apparent when one reads the Court's explicit analysis in
light of the fact that the Cleveland program, like the
other voucher programs currently in place, contains no
restrictions on how private schools use voucher money
and no meaningful educational requirements for recipient schools. 2 The Court's only reference to the nature of
the schools to which children are transferred under the
program is to say that a private school "may participate
in the program and accept program students so long as
the school is located within the boundaries of a covered
district and meets statewide educational standards."3
The Court manifested no awareness that statewide educational standards for private schools in Ohio, as in
other states, are quite superficial and by no means
ensure that private schools provide significant secular
education, let alone secular education of any particular
quality.4 Absent meaningful regulation, in the voucher
program or in general state laws governing private
schools, the state can, under the vo~cher program, fund
almost the entire operating budget of a school that provides little or no secular education, a school that might
instead have children spending the entire day reading
the Bible and saying prayers or, as was true in at least
one school participating in the program, watching religious videos.s The Cleveland program therefore can,
and the evidence suggests actually does, pay for purely
religious activity. More disturbingly, it is also facilitating transfer of some children from public schools,
which at least aim to provide a secular education, to
private schools that do not aim to provide a secular
education.
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In the Court's analysis, two perceived aspects of the
voucher program were sufficient to immunize it from
Establishment Clause challenge-first, that state payments to religious schools are indirect,6 and second, that
the program does not coerce parents into sending their
children to religious schools? The payments to schools
are indirect, in the Court's view, even though the state
in fact sends a check directly to participating schools,
because schools receive a check from the state only after
parents who have received state-issued vouchers
choose the school for their children and bring the
voucher to the school. The program does not coerce
parents, because parents have a variety of school alternatives available to them, including non-sectarian private schools that participate in the voucher program, as
well as several public school options, such as community schools and magnet schools.

". .. the state can, under the voucher
program, fund almost the entire
operating budget of a school that
provides little or no secular education, a
school that might instead have children
spending the entire day reading the
Bible and saying prayers or .
watching religious videos.
II

In light of the fact that nothing in the voucher program ensures that recipient schools provide any secular
education, the Court's analysis thus implicitly rests on
the remarkable principle that states may pay for purely
religious activities, so long as (1) states do so only when
asked to do so by private parties, and (2) the private
parties could instead have directed the state to pay for
non-religious activities that take place in a setting
resembling, at least superficially, the setting in which
the religious activities take place. 8 If the Court were to
apply this principle consistently in the future, states
might be permitted to pay for every aspect of religious
practice in America. As illustrated below, it would not
be difficult for a state to find soine loosely analogous
secular activity to include in a program of funding and
to issue vouchers to individuals to use either at the religious or the secular activity.
This principle is clearly at odds with one the Court
had affirmed in numerous prior cases involving state
aid to private entities-namely, that any program of
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state aid for 'private service providers must contain
safeguards (i.e., regulations) to ensure that the public
money is used by private recipients, even those affiliated with religious organizations, only for secular functions. In Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board,9 for
example, every member of the Court took the view that
state aid may not be used for the religious functions of
any private entity. The plurality opinion in that case
stated, with respect to educational institutions specifically, that
a secular purpose and facial neutrality
may not be enough, if in fact the State
is lending direct support to a religious
activity. The State may not, for example, pay for what is actually a religious
education, even though it purports to
be paying for a secular one, and even
though it makes its aid available to secular and religious institutions alike.lO
Remarkably, the Zelman majority did not even mention
Roemer, yet implicitly overturned this aspect of the Roemer decision. Zelman implicitly holds that states may
pay not only for religious instruction, but also for religious worship.

u . . . states wishing to pay for Sunday
school and church construction could
lend an air of religious neutrality to their
spending by structuring the programs to
subsidize 'any Sunday morning
educational programs for children' or
'any construction of buildings in which
non-profit organizations hold regular
gatherings open to the public.
III

Along the way to establishing this new and remarkable principle, the Court (a) further trivialized the secular-purpose prong of the post-Agostini Lemon test, (b)
effectively gave private individuals the power to waive
constitutional restrictions on state action, and (c) further
entrenched an approach to deciding constitutional disputes relating to children's education that treats as relevant only the effects of state action on adults.
Although the secular-purpose requirement was not
contested, the Court indicated that it perceived a valid
secular purpose, and in doing so signaled a willingness
to allow the most general characterization of the state's
motivation to serve as a basis for finding a valid purpose. ll As such, it would appear virtually impossible

12

for a state with a minimally competent legal staff to fail
to satisfy the requirement. The Court articulated the
purpose of the Cleveland voucher program in two
ways.
First, in its summary of the facts, the Court repeatedly described the purpose of the Pilot Project Scholarship Program as one of providing choice for parents,12
rather than one of improving secular education for children. The Court thereby masked the reality that the
Cleveland program, by design, facilitates the choice of
schooling that provides little or no secular education,
but instead provides primarily or solely religious
instruction and worship. If a purpose so general as
"providing choice" suffices for Establishment Clause
purposes, it is difficult to imagine a program of public
subsidies that could not satisfy the purpose prong. Payments for Sunday school could be said to have the very
same purpose as that identified for Cleveland's voucher
program-namely, providing educational choices for
parents. A state could justify paying for construction of
churches and synagogues by asserting a purpose of
providing citizens choices with respect to social activities or forms of self-expression, or a purpose of providing more buildings for people to use. While the Court's
discussion of the secular-purpose requirement in Zelman does not suggest the need to do so, states wishing
to pay for Sunday school and church construction could
lend an air of religious neutrality to their spending by
structuring the programs to subsidize "any Sunday
morning educational programs for children" or "any
construction of buildings in which non-profit organizations hold regular gatherings open to the public."
Second, in its constitutional analysis, the Court cursorily dispensed with the secular-purpose requirement
by stating that there was "no dispute that the program
challenged here was enacted for the valid secular pur~
pose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system."13
"Educational assistance" is less amorphous than
"choice," but it is also a very broad concept, sufficiently
so as to accommodate assistance for Sunday school or
mid-week after-school catechism classes, given that the
ordinary meaning of "educational" includes religious
instruction, no matter how indoctrinatory in nature.
Similarly broad purposes could be ascribed to state subsidies for any other kind of religious activity; subsidies
for worship by religious congregations would provide
"assistance for social activities" or "self-expression support," subsidies for purchase of Bibles for distribution
on the streets would provide" assistance for purchase
and public distribution of ancient texts," and subsidies
for Catholic priests to perform sacraments, such as baptisms and last rites, would provide "assistance for
stage-of-life ceremonies performed by recognized lead-
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ers of cultural gro\1ps." Such purposes might seem
more disingenuous than "educational assistance" seems
in the circumstances of the Cleveland program, but presumably a vague reference to "providing educational
assistance" will also satisfy the secular-purpose requirement in the potentially far different circumstances in
which other voucher programs will likely be created
following Zelman, where the actual motivation is more
clearly to advance religion.
If the Court had wished to characterize the state's

purpose in a more specific, and thereby meaningful
way, it would have had a couple of choices. The Court
could have said the purpose of the program is to
improve the secular education that children in Cleveland receive. Justice Rehnquist, who authored the
majority opinion, might have avoided characterizing
the purpose of the program in this way because nothing
in the design of the program supports a conclusion that
this was actually the state's purpose. As noted above,
the program does not contain academic requirements
and standards that would ensure schools receiving state
money actually provide a minimally adequate secular
education. The Court might also have avoided characterizing the purpose in this way because doing so
would have made it more difficult to ignore, in its
effects analysis, whether that purpose is actually being
served by the program as a whole, or by payments to
each participating private school. By characterizing the
purpose as "choice," the Court could instead focus
exclusively on whether parents in fact have a choice.
Alternatively, the Court might have characterized
the state's purpose as one of paying for children to
attend whatever sort of non-public school their parents
wish them to attend, within the range of schools that
satisfy the state's superficial curricular requirements for
operating a non-public school. The Court might have
avoided characterizing the purpose of the program in
this way because it would make it more apparent that
the state must have known some parents would use the
state money to place their children in schools that pro- .
vide little or no secular education, a use of state money
for which it would be difficult to discern a secular purpose.
Because the plaintiffs actually did not contest the
existence of a secular purpose, the bulk of the Court's
analysis in Zelman is devoted to the question of whether
the voucher program has the effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion. In answering that question, the
Court appeared simply to assume that the program
does nothing other than provide "educational assistance,"14 which the Court must have understood to
mean money to purchase what the state regards as "education" for children and what the state can permissibly
aim to assist-that is, instruction in secular subjects.
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The Court never grappled with the problem that the
voucher program does not actually require parents to
use the vouchers to purchase that kind of schooling,
and does not preclude them from using state money to
pay for purely religious activities. For the Court, where
the state money went and what it was used for were
rendered irrelevant by the fact that parents decided
those things.
But this position is equivalent to holding that private parties are empowered to waive constitutional
restrictions on state spending, or that the state is free to
do indirectly what it may not constitutionally do directly, another principle that the Court had rejected in prior
cases, albeit in other contexts,15 The Court acknowledged that if the state simply started sending money to
private schools, including religious schools, without
also creating slips of paper called "vouchers" that the
state mails to parents, parents give to schools, and
schools send back to the state, it could not constitutionally do so. Presumably this would be true even if the
state made the payments on a per-pupil basis. By reaching the opposite outcome based solely on the fact that
Ohio does first issue a slip of paper called a "voucher"
to parents and sends money to a religious school only
after the ·parents give the paper to the school and the
school returns the paper to the state, the Court in effect
held that states may do something otherwise unconstitutional so long as they create a mechanism for making
apparent to the world that some private parties want
them to do it.
There is nothing in the Court's decision to prevent
this holding from being extended to state payment for
private schools that admit only white people and/ or
only males (as long as vouchers are also available for
non-exclusionary schools), or to state subsidies for
racially exclusive parks, clubs, and residential developments (e.g., by issuing user fee, dues, or housing vouchers). At a further reach, the principle might extend to
non-spending state activity. May police now assist private business owners in keeping all African-Americans
out of their establishments, because this state assistance
is provided only at the request of a private party? The
Court might some day develop a way of distinguishing
Establishment Clause constraints from other constitutional constraints, but it might find it difficult rationally
to do so, and it would still have to grapple with the
possibility of state vouchers for every other kind of religious activity.
The reason why the Court focused on parental
choice and the range of school options available to parents-in terms of the superficial characteristic of being
affiliated with a religious denomination or not, rather
than on what was actually going on in the schools
receiving state aid-is that its perspective is entirely
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adult-centered. All of the Justices were preoccupied
with whether parents were being coerced to patronize
religious schools, and for the majority that was all that
mattered. The dissenters were also concerned about taxpayers having to pay for religious indoctrination. None
of the Justices manifested concern that some children
might be denied a secular education as a result of the
voucher program, if their parents shifted them from a
public school to a religious school that provided little or
no secular education, or that the state might be paying
for some parents to place their children in an environment hostile to the children's interests in autonomy, in
freedom of thought and expression, and in gender
equality. Insofar as these things are happening, the state
is clearly advancing religion, and potentially violating
the rights of some children.

I/[T]he public controversy over school
vouchers has not really been very much
about helping children.

to fund every kind of religious practice in every kind of
setting, so long as the states are able to include superficially analogous secular activities in the same funding
program, and so long as they allow private parties to
decide how much they spend on religious practices and
how much on the secular analogues. If states run with
this new license, the Court might find itself in the
future scrambling to scale it back by creating new limiting principles, and if so we can look forward to many
more years of incoherent Establishment Clause doctrine.
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More generally, the public controversy over school
vouchers has not really been very much about helping
children. For most voucher supporters, it has been
about increasing the power of parents over their children's lives, advancing the cause of religious groups
that run schools, and reducing the redistribution of
wealth that state spending on education entails. For
their part, most opponents of vouchers have not argued
that voucher programs should be designed so as to
advance the educational interests of all children (e.g., by
requiring that spending on public schools remain constant or increase and by requiring voucher schools to
satisfy academic standards), but rather have taken a
stance of absolute opposition to any and all subsidies
for private schools. This suggests that their concerns,
too, are other than for the well-being of children. They
have manifested no concern, for example, about the fact
that many children are currently in private schools that,
like many public schools, lack adequate resources.
As noted at the outset, the Cleveland voucher program is probably doing good for some students, so it is
not tragic that the Court has allowed the program to
continue. What is regrettable is that the Court did not
command Ohio and other states that are operating
voucher programs, or that might do so in the future, to
do it right-that is, to incorporate into their voucher
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career chosen by adult aid recipients, designed to create equal
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and secondary schools, on the other hand, is religious indoctrination of children. While it is surely a legitimate aim of the state
to create equal opportunity for disabled persons, it is as surely
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indoctrinated.
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